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I.

Introduction
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank) provides
a private cause of action to certain persons who notify the government of illegalities occurring
within the financial industry, then subsequently experience employer retaliation for such
notification.2 These persons are generally referred to as “whistleblowers.” Confusion has arisen
over who merits protection because the Dodd-Frank definition of whistleblower arguably conflicts
with the statute’s anti-retaliation provision.3 Although the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has issued regulations which attempt to resolve the potential ambiguity created by the
statutory conflict,4 courts have taken varying approaches leading to conflicting conclusions as to
whether statutory ambiguity exists, and if so, whether to defer to the SEC’s interpretation of the
statute. I begin with a brief overview of the legislative backdrop to Dodd-Frank and proceed to
analyze the statutory text and the SEC’s implementation thereunder. Next, I provide taxonomy of
the case law addressing the statute: opinions protecting whistleblowers who report to entities other
than the SEC;5 courts finding the statute to be ambiguous, but nonetheless deferring to the SEC;6
and a third group of cases finding Dodd-Frank to require whistleblowers to make disclosures
directly to the SEC.7 I then conclude that employer anti-retaliation protection should only be
available to whistleblowers who provide the SEC with information in a manner subject to the SEC’s
discretion. Under my theory, the Commission was given direct authority to establish the manner in

1

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
3
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
4
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2014).
5
See, e.g., Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
6
See, e.g., Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing six district court cases).
2

7

See, e.g., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
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which it would receive information, and pursuant to this authority, the Commission established this
manner through various regulations which implement Dodd-Frank.8
II.

Legislative Backdrop to the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program
In 2010, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank after determining that reform of existing securities
laws were generally necessary due to the terrible toll which the 2008 financial crisis exacted on the
U.S. economy.9 Congress included a new and robust “Whistleblower Program”10 to motivate
persons possessing reasonable belief of potential securities laws violations to inform the SEC of
their suspicion.11 Generally, Congress favorably views persons who notify the government of
potential illegalities, customarily termed “whistleblowers,” because the information which the
government receives frequently helps rectify illegal behavior.12 Specifically, Congress designed the
Whistleblower Program to motivate persons possessing reasonable belief of potential securities
laws violations to inform the SEC of their suspicion.13
Congress attempted to provide whistleblower protection because the information provided
by whistleblowers would often not be easily discovered through external SEC investigations.14
Therefore, Congress sought to incentivize whistleblowers to file more reports, which, in turn, would
improve the transparency of the financial system and decrease the likelihood of another financial
crisis materializing.15 Certified Fraud Examiner and Madoff whistleblower Harry Markopolos
demonstrated the historical efficiency of whistleblower programs when he testified in front of the

8

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b).
S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 39-40.
10
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
11
S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 39-40.
12
Id. at 40.
13
Id. at 38.
14
Id. at 39-40.
15
The Dodd-Frank Act declares its purpose: “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving ...
transparency in the financial system ... to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.” The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
9
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Senate Banking Committee16 urging enactment of the Whistleblower Program. Markopolos cited
statistics showing the historical efficacy of such programs where “whistleblower tips detected
54.1% of uncovered fraud schemes in public companies,”17 while SEC exam teams, and all other
external auditors, “detected a mere 4.1%.”18 Notably, whistleblower tips were also shown to be
thirteen times more effective than all external audits.19
Due to the demonstrated success of whistleblowing, Congress attempted to solve the
historical impediments faced by whistleblowers. The most significant of such impediments is the
deterrence factor which prevents employees who may wish to notify the government of wrongdoing
from doing so due to the potential risk of adverse employment action in retaliation for such
whistleblowing. The concept is not new; other federal statutes afford anti-retaliation protection to
whistleblowers,20 making illegal employer discrimination against such employees. Per Dodd-Frank,
Congress expanded whistleblower protection within the financial industry through various means.
The broader scope of the new Whistleblower Program seeks to increase motivation for
“potential whistleblowers to come forward and help the government identify and prosecute
fraudsters,”21 by incentivizing whistleblowers with monetary awards, and through expanding the
definition of whistleblower and thereby extending anti-retaliation protection to more persons.22
Congress incentivized whistleblowers by authorizing monetary awards for whistleblowers who
provide information which leads to government recoveries equaling or exceeding one million
dollars.23 The new anti-retaliation provision protects whistleblowers from employers who

16

S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 110-11.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., 1 Lit. Wrong. Discharge Claims § 2:86 (listing federal statutes containing anti-retaliation provisions).
21
S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 112-114.
22
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (clarifying that subsidiaries and affiliates of issuers may not retaliate against
whistleblowers, eliminating a defense often raised by issuers).
23
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
17
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“discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment.”24 Specifically,
this provision prohibits employer retaliation stemming from lawful acts committed by
whistleblowers in providing information to, or assisting the SEC with, investigations or actions
concerning their employers’ potential securities law violations, and in making disclosures that are
required or protected under any other law, rule, or regulation within the SEC’s jurisdiction.25
Congress directly delegated authority to the SEC to develop specific regulations implementing such
provisions.26
Pursuant to such authority, the SEC proposed 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b),27 and, as is
customary in administrative agency rule issuance, interested groups and individuals submitted
comments which the SEC considered before finalizing the rules.28 The National Whistleblowers
Center (NWC)29 submitted one such comment which informed the SEC of the results of its study
on qui tam30 actions filed between 2007 and 2010. In the NWC conducted study, nearly all
whistleblowers were found to have first attempted to resolve matters through internal means by
speaking with their superiors, filing an internal complaint, or both.31 In finalizing § 240.21F-2(b),
the SEC expressly sought to “ensure that the whistleblower program does not undermine the
willingness of individuals to make whistleblower reports internally at their companies before they

24

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1).
Id.
26
15 U.S.C. § 78w (2010).
27
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b).
28
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
29
See NWC Comment to Proposed Rules, Impact of Qui Tam Laws on Internal Compliance: A Report to the Securities
Exchange Commission, at 6 (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter NWC Comment].
30
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (illustrating qui tam actions filed by relators).
31
NWC Comment at 8.
25
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make reports to the Commission.”32 In light of documented whistleblower discrimination, the SEC
determined the decision of “whether or not to internally report is best left for whistleblowers.”33
While the anti-retaliation provision generally prohibits employer discrimination by reason
of whistleblower notification of potential employer illegality pertaining to securities laws, since its
enactment, federal courts are divided over whether protection is solely available to whistleblowers
who provide information directly to the SEC, or whether protection is also available to
whistleblowers who report violations internally, do not notify the SEC, and subsequently
experience employment retaliation. This inconsistency creates the likelihood that employees will
first report to the SEC, even though the SEC provides strong incentives34 for individuals to report
internally in the first instance, if appropriate.35
III.

The Text of the Whistleblower Program
The Whistleblower Program provides a private cause of action for whistleblowers who
experience adverse employment action from their employers. Confusion has arisen over who merits
protection because the statutory definition of the term whistleblower has been found to conflict with
statutory enumerations of whistleblower activities protected under the anti-retaliation provision.
The Whistleblower Program provides the following definition of whistleblower:
The term “whistleblower” means any individual who provides, or 2 or more
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by
the Commission.36
This clause, when read in isolation, would seem to require an individual to submit information
directly to the Commission in order to fall within this definition. However, various courts have

32

Proposed Rules at 70,490.
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,326-34,327 (June 13, 2011)
[hereinafter Adopting Release].
34
Adopting Release at 34,301.
35
Adopting Release at 34,322.
36
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
33

7

found the anti-retaliation provision in Dodd-Frank to be irreconcilable with this statutory definition.
The anti-retaliation provision prohibits employer retaliation by reason of three distinct
whistleblower undertakings:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms
and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such
information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, including section 78j-1(m)
of this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”37
Under the first two subsections, the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision explicitly prohibits
employer discrimination against whistleblowers who provide information to the Commission, or
assist the Commission in an action based upon information which was provided to the
Commission.38 Unlike the first two subsections, the third subsection does not require direct
disclosure to the Commission; employer discrimination is prohibited against whistleblowers who
make required or protected disclosures which fall into one of four categories, which, in many
instances, do not involve the Commission. Thus, it is this third subsection that merits further
attention.
The first category within the third subsection of the anti-retaliation provision prohibits
discrimination against whistleblowers who make required or protected disclosures under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The SOX provides whistleblower protection for employees of
publicly traded companies where any employee is threatened “in the terms and conditions of

37
38

15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
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employment” because of acts committed to assist in an investigation regarding conduct reasonably
believed to be in violation of any SEC rule or regulation, “or any provision of Federal law relating
to fraud against shareholders,” where
[I]nformation or assistance is provided to, or the investigation is conducted by:
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate
misconduct).39
Whistleblowers making required or protected disclosures under “this chapter, including
section 78j-1(m) of this title”40 fall into the second category of the third subsection of the DoddFrank anti-retaliation provision. Section 78j-1(m) specifies audit reporting requirements.41 The
third category within the third subsection of the anti-retaliation provision, enumerating required or
protected whistleblower disclosures, are those made under “section 1513(e) of Title 18.”42 Under §
1513(e), “whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate,” takes any harmful action “for providing
to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible
commission of any Federal offense,” is in violation of the statute.43 The final category incorporates
whistleblower disclosures which are required or protected under “any other law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”44 This is the catchall provision.
A. SEC Implementation of the Whistleblower Program
Congress explicitly mandated the SEC to issue regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Program.45 Within one such regulation,46 the SEC distinguished between the term

39

18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
41
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2010).
42
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
43
18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2008).
44
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(a).
46
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2.
40
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whistleblower as it pertains to persons eligible to receive awards, and as to persons subject to antiretaliation protection.47 Under the former, for potential award eligibility:
You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you provide the Commission
with information ... and the information relates to a possible violation of the federal
securities laws.48
The regulation proceeds:
For purposes of the protections afforded by [the anti-retaliation provision] ... you are
a whistleblower if you provide information in a manner described in [the antiretaliation provision].49
Therefore, the SEC has taken the stance that whistleblowers must disclose to the SEC in order to
be eligible to receive an award, but doing so is not necessary in order to receive anti-retaliation
protection. This is so because the regulation incorporates the required or protected disclosures
found within the four categories of the third subsection of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision
into the definition of whistleblower for purposes of determining who warrants employer retaliation
protection. The regulation then confirms: “The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.”50
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Whistleblower Program
Under the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, courts mainly fall into two different camps
concerning the issue of whether employment retaliation protection is solely available for
whistleblowers who provide information of potential securities laws violations directly to the SEC,
or whether protection may also be available for whistleblowers who exclusively report violations
internally to their employers. The majority view among the district courts holds that direct
disclosure to the SEC is not necessary, provided at least one of the other required or protected

47

Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2).
49
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
50
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii).
48
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disclosures set out in the anti-retaliation provision are met.51 There are two means by which courts
reach this conclusion. Under one approach, courts find that the Whistleblower Program is
unambiguous and also find the anti-retaliation provision to constitute an implied exception to the
statutory whistleblower definition. Under the second approach, courts reach this same conclusion
by finding the Whistleblower Program to be ambiguous,52 and then defer to SEC regulations.53
Courts which have found the whistleblower definition and anti-retaliation provisions to conflict
have noted that the latter would be rendered superfluous54 if disclosure to the SEC was a necessary
prerequisite for anti-retaliation protection. Courts in the opposing camp find that the Whistleblower
Program is unambiguous in that it requires disclosure to the SEC to meet the definition. The issue
is not ripe for Supreme Court review,55 even though a majority of district courts have found the
Whistleblower Program to be ambiguous, because the Fifth Circuit56 remains the only circuit court
to have directly ruled upon this issue.
1. District Courts Finding Whistleblower to Encompass Disclosure to Other-than-SEC Entities

Prior to the SEC issuing final regulations, the Southern District of New York, in Egan v.
TradingScreen, Inc.,57 was confronted with a scenario where an employee of a financial software
company reported his suspicion to the company’s president that the CEO of the company illegally
was diverting assets, and allegedly the reporting employee was then terminated.58 The issue before

51

Id.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
53
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Berman, v.
Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., No. 1:14-CV-523-GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583, at 62 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014).
54
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85 (2001).
55
See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR L.L.C., 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1175 (2014) (extending whistleblower protection to employees
of private contractors and to subcontractors serving public companies).
56
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
57
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
58
Id. at *1-2.
52
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the court was whether the internal report and subsequent termination provided the employee with a
private cause of action under the Whistleblower Program.59 The District Court held:
[T]he contradictory provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act are best harmonized by
reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of certain whistleblower
disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception to 15 U.S.C. §
78u–6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the SEC.60
Similarly, Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C.61 confronted the Federal District Court of
Nebraska with a situation where a licensed Certified Public Accountant (CPA), working as an
independent contractor for an independent securities clearing firm, complied with requests from the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), despite her employer’s request that she “stall,
delay, stop digging, and stop responding”

62

to such requests. The CPA was subsequently

terminated, allegedly for disclosing securities violations through internal means.63 The District
Court held that the CPA’s actions constituted protected activity under Dodd-Frank, and found “the
result flows from the statute itself, and it is not necessary to determine if deference to the SEC's
construction of the statute is warranted.”64 The court stated the anti-retaliation provision “covers a
broad array of disclosures to entities other than the SEC,”65 and by complying and cooperating with
FINRA’s investigation and through preparing a report regarding violations, the CPA made
disclosures which were “required by a rule subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.”66 The court
acknowledged statutory definitions usually control the meaning of statutory words, then proceeded

59

Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *5.
61
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *1 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
62
Id. at *6.
63
Id. at *7.
64
Id. at *15.
65
Id. at *6.
66
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *16 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
60
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to read the anti-retaliation provision “using the word ‘whistleblower’ in its everyday sense.”67 The
court cited the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary and the Black's Law Dictionary and noted that,
in its everyday use, a whistleblower is “a person who tells police, reporters, etc., about something
(such as a crime) that has been kept secret, [or an] employee who reports employer wrongdoing to
a governmental or law-enforcement agency.”68 The court opined “if this reading of the term
‘whistleblower’ is applied to the anti-retaliation provision—while maintaining the statutory
definition for the other subsections, which deal solely with the bounty program—all parts of the
statute fit together into a harmonious and coherent whole.”69 The District Court justified its method
by stating: “when applying the definition to the provision at issue would defeat that provision’s
purpose, the Court will not mechanically read the statutory definition into that provision,”70 and
noted that a failure to do so would render the anti-retaliation provision “insignificant, and its
purpose—to shield a broad range of employee disclosures—[would] be thwarted.”71
A majority of district courts have reached this same result by plugging the statutory
definition of whistleblower into the substantive anti-retaliation provision. Courts doing so find the
resulting conflict to render the Whistleblower Program ambiguous. Courts find ambiguity because
a literal reading of the definition of the term whistleblower, “any individual who provides ...
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission,”72 into the antiretaliation provision, which protects whistleblowers who make disclosures to individuals or entities
other than the SEC, potentially renders the anti-retaliation provision superfluous.73 In Rosenblum

67

Id. at *11.
Id.
69
Id. at *11-12.
70
Id.
71
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *11 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
72
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
73
See 12 U.S.C. § 5302 (2008) (setting forth severability clause of Dodd-Frank).
68
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v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.,74 a case which adequately summarizes the view held by a
majority of district courts, the Southern District of New York opined, when considering the DoddFrank Whistleblower Program “as a whole, it is plain that a narrow reading of the statute requiring
a report to the SEC conflicts with the anti-retaliation provision, which does not have such a
requirement.”75 There, an employee was allegedly harassed and ultimately terminated after
informing his supervisors, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), of a potential
securities law violation.76 Despite not notifying the SEC, the court found that SOX protected
disclosures of this type, thus the employee plausibly stated protected activity under Dodd-Frank.77
This caused the court to declare the Whistleblower Program ambiguous.78 Next, the court found it
appropriate to consider the SEC's interpretation of the statute and regulations thereunder.79 The
court then stated “the 2011 rule promulgated by the SEC, which was given authority by Congress
to implement [the Whistleblower Program], does not require a report to the SEC in order to obtain
whistleblower protection.”80
2. Courts Finding the Whistleblower Program Unambiguous in its Requirement of Disclosure
to the SEC

The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,81 also found the Whistleblower
Program to be unambiguous, but unlike the Southern District of New York in Egan v.
TradingScreen, Inc.,82 nor the Federal District Court of Nebraska in Bussing v. COR Clearing,

74

Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 147-48.
76
Id. at 145.
77
Id. at 148.
78
Id. at 146.
79
Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
80
Id. at 148.
81
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
82
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
75
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L.L.C.,83 the Fifth Circuit found the statute, “standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of the
anti-retaliation provision.”84 In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., an employee served as G.E.
Energy’s Iraq Country Executive in Amman, Jordan.85 When Iraqi officials informed the employee
“of their concern that GE Energy hired a woman closely associated with a senior Iraqi official to
curry favor with that official in negotiating a lucrative joint venture agreement,”86 the employee
reported the potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation to his supervisor as well as
a G.E. Energy ombudsperson.87 Thereafter, the employee allegedly received a negative
performance review, was demoted, and eventually was terminated.88 In finding the Whistleblower
Program unambiguous, the court stated that the statutory language answers two questions: “(1) who
is protected; and (2) what actions constitute protected activity.”89 The court also found “under the
plain language and structure of Dodd–Frank, there are not conflicting definitions of
whistleblower.”90 The Fifth Circuit decided that the third category of disclosures covered by the
anti-retaliation provision91 was not rendered superfluous because it would still protect individuals
who first filed a complaint with the SEC, then experienced retaliation for required or protected
disclosures under the securities laws, at a time when the employer lacked knowledge of the
employee’s disclosure to the SEC.92

83

Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 2111207, at *1 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) motion to
certify appeal granted, No. 8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014).
84
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
85
Id. at 621.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013).
90
Id. at 626.
91
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
92
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627-628 (5th Cir. 2013).
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Likewise, the Northern District of California, in Banko v. Apple Inc.,93 followed the Fifth
Circuit’s Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.94 holding and determined Dodd-Frank only affords
whistleblower protection to individuals who meet the definition of whistleblower through
disclosing information directly to the SEC.95 In Banko v. Apple Inc., an employee gained knowledge
of a co-worker’s retention incentives and reimbursement for personal expenses which potentially
violated applicable securities laws.96 The employee reported the conduct to the company’s human
resources department, and then the co-worker was terminated.97 Shortly thereafter, the reporting
employee experienced animosity from other co-workers, and then the reporting employee was
terminated.98 The court found that whistleblower protection is only available to individuals who
meet the statutory definition of a whistleblower because “a contrary conclusion would ignore
several canons of statutory interpretation.”99 The court stated that the words “to the
Commission,”100 within the whistleblower definition, would violate the surplusage canon if
ignored, and that allowing individuals who do not satisfy the definition to bring a claim would
contradict the anti-retaliation provision’s title: “Protection of Whistleblowers.”101
IV.

Overview of Analysis
Employer anti-retaliation protection should only be available to whistleblowers, i.e. only if
made by individuals who provide “information ... to the Commission, in a manner established, by
rule or regulation, by the Commission.”102 This notion reaches the same result as both the Southern

93

Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 2013 WL 7394596, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013).
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 627-628 (5th Cir. 2013).
95
Banko v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-02977 RS, 2013 WL 7394596, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013).
96
Id.
97
Id. at *3-4.
98
Id. at *4.
99
Id. at *7.
100
Id. at *8.
101
Id.
102
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
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District of New York’s holding in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., which held the “contradictory
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are best harmonized by reading the anti-retaliation provision as
a narrow exception to the whistleblower definition,”103 and also the Federal District Court of
Nebraska’s opinion in Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., which construed the statute with dictionary
definitions of whistleblower, then found protection for internal reports “flows from the statute
itself.”104 Unlike in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., where the court could not defer to SEC regulations
because the case was decided six days before the regulations were finalized, and dissimilar to
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., which disregarded the statutory definition of whistleblower and
instead deferred to two dictionaries,105 the protection of persons who report to entities other than
the SEC is warranted when Dodd-Frank, its predecessors, amendments and concomitant
authorizations, as well as the regulations thereunder, are read as a whole. While the anti-retaliation
provision protects whistleblowers who make disclosures to entities other than the SEC, these
disclosures are still made by persons who satisfy the statutory definition of whistleblower. This is
so because Congress explicitly delegated authority to the SEC to establish “by rule or regulation”106
the manner in which it would receive information from whistleblowers. This authorization is
directly found in the statutory definition of whistleblower.107 This argument does not have known
support from sources other than Dodd-Frank and the SEC rules and regulations thereunder.
A. Transparent Analysis of the SEC’s Judicature
Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to make rules and regulations to “classify persons
... reports,”108 and other matters within the SEC’s jurisdiction and to “prescribe greater, lesser, or
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different requirements for different classes thereof.”109 For purposes of the anti-retaliation
provision, the authority to “classify persons” should include the power to designate persons who
may be considered whistleblowers, and the authority to “classify reports” should provide the SEC
with authority to designate internally filed reports as “subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.”110 Under the SEC regulations, persons are only required to directly provide the
Commission with information for purposes of the bounty program;111 for purposes of the antiretaliation provision, protection is afforded where information is provided in a manner consistent
with that provision.112 Dodd-Frank is unambiguous in this regard. This outcome is similarly reached
by finding the anti-retaliation provision to conflict with the statutory definition of whistleblower,
then deferring to the SEC. Because this result encourages whistleblowing, courts in this camp
further the basic policy behind the very existence of securities regulation, which is to improve
transparency within the financial markets; achieving transparency is also the purpose of the DoddFrank Act.113
As previously noted, the Whistleblower Program defines a whistleblower as: “any
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating
to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”114 The Commission established the manner:
To be considered a whistleblower under [the Whistleblower Program], you must
submit your information about a possible securities law violation by either of these
methods:
(1) Online, through the Commission’s website located at www.sec.gov; or
109
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(2) By mailing or faxing a Form TCR ... to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower.115
Form TCR stands for “Tips, Complaints, and Referrals.”116 Separate government entities may use
this form when referring matters to the SEC. The SEC has also provided that “the Commission
may, in its sole discretion, waive any of these procedures based upon a showing of extraordinary
circumstances.”117 Congress provided the SEC with authority to establish regulations which
implement Dodd-Frank. This authority included establishing the manner in which the SEC would
receive information. Under this authority, the SEC issued a regulation which established the manner
in which it would receive reports, and also issued a regulation which reserved its right to change
the manner in which it would receive reports. Therefore, the manner in which the SEC will receive
reports remains within the SEC’s discretion. When the Congressional authorization contained
within the definition of whistleblower along with the regulations are viewed in the aggregate, the
SEC has implied that one manner in which it will accept information is through referrals from
separate agencies; under extraordinary circumstances, the SEC may also waive this requirement.118
As previously mentioned, the SEC has provided: “the anti-retaliation protections apply whether or
not you satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.”119 Therefore,
if an extraordinary circumstance is not found, a person not satisfying the aforementioned
regulations should still be considered a whistleblower, and the anti-retaliation provisions should
still provide protection, despite the fact that the whistleblower cannot receive an award. Further
SEC rulemaking authority is explicit in the Whistleblower Program:
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The Commission shall have the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent
with the purposes of this section.120
The entire purpose of the whistleblowing strategy is to improve transparency in the financial
system.121 Restricting the definition of whistleblowers to only those individuals who report
violations of the securities laws to the Commission becomes an unacceptable impediment to
improving transparency in the financial system because various violations of the securities laws do
not require direct reporting122 of violations to the SEC.123
Similarly, because Congress included disclosure methods within the anti-retaliation
provision which do not require direct disclosure to the SEC, legislative intent to protect persons
who do not report directly to the SEC may be understood through the statutory text. This remains
true despite the statutory definition of whistleblower. Specifically, the anti-retaliation provision
prohibits employer retaliation by reason of three distinct whistleblower actions.124 Only the first
subsection explicitly prohibits employer discrimination against whistleblowers who provide
information to the Commission.125 The second subsection prohibits discrimination against
whistleblowers “in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission.”126 Therefore a whistleblower may receive protection for
assisting the Commission with information provided by some other person or entity. The third
120
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subsection prohibits employer discrimination against whistleblowers who make required or
protected disclosures which fall into one of four categories, and many of these disclosures are
permissibly made to entities other than the SEC.127 Under the first category, the anti-retaliation
provision incorporates “disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.”128 Thus, the statutory language suggests that persons who notify entities pursuant to SOX
reporting procedures should be afforded Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections. For example, in
certain situations, SOX protects disclosures made to “a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.”129 Thus, persons who receive protection under SOX should also receive anti-retaliation
protection under Dodd-Frank.
Whistleblowers making required or protected disclosures under “this chapter, including
section 78j-1(m) of this title”130 fall into the second category of the third subsection of the antiretaliation provision. Section 78j-1(m) specifies audit reporting requirements, while the
Whistleblower Program specifically disallows awards “to any whistleblower who gains the
information through the performance of an audit of financial statements.”131 This inclusion within
the anti-retaliation provision evidences the fact that one may be a whistleblower for purposes of the
anti-retaliation provision while one may not concurrently be privy to receive an award.
Furthermore, section 78j-1 requires audit committees to establish procedures for “the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees ... of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing
matters.”132 Notifications submitted pursuant to required procedures should constitute protected
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disclosures and therefore should be considered lawful acts “done by the whistleblower,”133
retaliation for which is prohibited.
The third category within the third subsection of the anti-retaliation provision specifies
disclosures made under “section 1513(e) of Title 18.”134 Under section 1513(e), “whoever
knowingly, with the intent to retaliate,” takes any harmful action “for providing to a law
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of
any Federal offense,”135 is in violation of the statute. This situation came to fruition in Rosenblum
v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.,136 where an employee notified an FBI agent of potential
securities violations and then received protection under the anti-retaliation provision. The antiretaliation provision explicitly includes disclosures made to law enforcement officers; this further
evidences Congress’s intent not to restrict the definition of whistleblower.
B. Case Law Analysis
1. District Court Cases: Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., and Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C.

Under the explicit statutory language, anti-retaliation protection is only available to
individuals who provide “information ... to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”137

Thus, the statute may be interpreted to support my

interpretation; amending the statute is unnecessary, but would provide clarity and prevent
dispensable litigation. In the split among the courts, my interpretation reaches the same conclusion
as courts which find the anti-retaliation provision to constitute an implied exception to the statutory
whistleblower definition. These decisions include the Southern District of New York in Egan v.
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TradingScreen, Inc.,138 and the Federal District Court of Nebraska’s in Bussing v. COR Clearing,
L.L.C.139 My interpretation is also in accordance with the majority of district court decisions,
including the Southern District of New York in Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.140
Courts in this camp find the Whistleblower Program to be ambiguous and then defer to SEC
regulations.
Further analysis of circuit cases reveals the imminence of a circuit split. One such case
which nearly aligned with the majority of district courts was Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding
Corp.,141 where an employee discovered that certain products were priced in a manner which
potentially violated relevant securities regulation, then proceeded to inform a company supervisor
instead of the SEC.142 On appeal, the Third Circuit referred to this circumstance as a “Dodd–Frank
cause of action,”143 but the issue before the court concerned whether or not Dodd-Frank amended
the SOX anti-arbitration provision. The Third Circuit held: “The text and structure of Dodd–Frank
compel the conclusion that whistleblower retaliation claims ... are not exempt from predispute
arbitration agreements.”144 This holding suggests the court would have found the person to be a
statutory whistleblower, or would have deferred to the SEC regulations. Because the court did not
affirm the decision below: “the Dodd–Frank Act is ambiguous with respect to who qualifies as a
whistleblower for purposes of the anti-retaliation provision of the statute” and “the SEC's rule is a
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permissible construction of the statute and warrants judicial deference,” 145 the Third Circuit’s
stance on the issue remains speculative.146
A Second Circuit case also provides insight. In Meng–Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G.,147 the Second
Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of an employer’s motion to dismiss because the antiretaliation provision does not apply extraterritorially.148 There, an employee of a Chinese subsidiary
whose German parent listed securities on an American exchange brought FCPA violations to the
attention of his supervisors in China and Germany.149 The employee then allegedly experienced
retaliation.150 Although the FCPA is situated among the securities laws, the court declined to
determine whether “internal reporting of alleged misconduct, with or without his subsequent
disclosures to the SEC, qualified him as a whistleblower under the Dodd–Frank Act.”151 Here, the
District Court had previously held that section 806 of SOX does not require or protect disclosures
of FCPA violations.152 Although withholding judgment on the issue of the direct conflict within the
Whistleblower Program of Dodd-Frank, the Second Circuit noted the most direct consequence of
the SEC regulations thereunder is that “anti-retaliation provisions protect even whistleblowers who,
for various reasons enumerated in the statute, cannot collect a bounty.”153 The court stated that this
“broadly suggests a separation between the conditions triggering the anti-retaliation provision and
those triggering the bounty provision.”154 Whether or not the Second Circuit would have deferred

145

Id. at *6.
Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149, 2014 WL 940703, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014), aff’d on
other grounds, 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014).
147
Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 330.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 333-334.
152
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
153
Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
154
Id.
146

24

to the SEC’s interpretation, that a person may be protected by the anti-retaliation provision without
being eligible for an award, also remains speculative.
2. The Fifth Circuit Wrongly Decided Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA)

The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., held the Whistleblower Program
“standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to
the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of the anti-retaliation provision.”155 The court
found that the anti-retaliation provision did not cause the Whistleblower Program to be
ambiguous.156 The court demonstrated its view, that the anti-retaliation provision was not
superfluous, through a hypothetical scenario: if an employee simultaneously files one report
internally and one with the SEC, the employee would receive protection under the anti-retaliation
provision even if the employer only knows of the existence of the internally filed report when it
discriminates against the employee.157 The anti-retaliation provision would provide protection
because the reporting employee would meet the statutory definition of a whistleblower as soon as
any report is filed with the SEC. This case was wrongly decided. Under the court’s rationale,
whether or not an employee receives anti-retaliation protection based on an internal report depends
upon the existence of an external SEC report. This is mistaken because if an employer is unaware
of a second disclosure, “any adverse employment action that the employer takes would appear to
lack the requisite retaliatory intent.”158 This construction would impermissibly impose strict
liability on an employer through excluding the necessary element of employer intent within a
retaliation claim.159
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The Southern District of New York adopted the Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C. holding
in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C.160 There, the finance director of Neo@Ogilvy North America, a
subsidiary of a publicly-traded foreign corporation, was responsible for compliance with Generally
Acceptable Accounting Principles (GAAP) and proper financial reporting.161 The subsidiary was
obligated under U.S. securities laws to detect and internally report “accounting irregularities, fraud
and material compliance failures.”162 The District Court focused its attention on the reporting
requirements contained in two other whistleblower laws passed alongside the Whistleblower
Program.163 In the court’s opinion, under the first law, contained in an amendment to the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), Congress prohibited employers from retaliating against
employees for reporting violations of the CEA, and “extended anti-retaliation protection only to
those individuals who had reported such violations to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission”164 (CFTC) or had “assisted in an investigation or judicial or administrative action of
the CFTC based upon such information.”165
The protections mentioned mirror the first two subsections of the anti-retaliation provision
of the Whistleblower Program. The court also commented that under the second law, contained in
another section of Dodd–Frank, employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees who
provide information about violations of any provision of law subject to the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB).166 The court stated that under that law, “an
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employee must first file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor and exhaust an administrative
process before bringing a private action in district court.”167 The District Court then opined that
“allowing a private right of action without first requiring contact with a government agency ...
seems ... extraordinary.”168
The provision169 of the CFTC to which the Southern District of New York referred, in
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., contains nearly identical language to the whistleblower protection
provision at issue, and under the CFTC statute, Congress explicitly stated “nothing in this section
shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any whistleblower under any
Federal or State law.”170 Likewise, while the second law, which concerns information subject to the
jurisdiction of the CFBP, provides preliminary authority to the Secretary of Labor and requires
exhaustion of an administrative process before a claimant may bring a private action, the District
Court failed to recognize that the statute also provides a process where the Secretary fails to act.171
Under the CFPB provision, after a certain period of time has lapsed a “complainant may bring an
action at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United States
having jurisdiction.”172 This differs from the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program at issue because,
unlike under the CFPB provision, here individuals are given standing for private causes of action
in the first instance.173
V.

Incentives and Compliance
If future circuit opinions are plentiful and similarly reach the differing outcomes illustrated
in the current district court and Fifth Circuit case law, whistleblowers would not retain incentives
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to report initially through internal means. Currently, the SEC provides monetary incentives for
individuals to report internally in the first instance, if appropriate. 174 Whistleblowers who initially
file internal reports should automatically be afforded Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program antiretaliation protection because the report should be viewed as “protected” under the second category
within the third subsection of disclosures enumerated within the anti-retaliation provision, which
includes disclosures made under “this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title.”175 Because
the SEC incentivizes whistleblowers initially to report internally, disclosures made pursuant to
incentives are arguably made under “this chapter.”176
Incentives for internal compliance serve to enhance the SEC’s enforcement efforts because
a company may have better insight into the claim and may make its findings available for the
SEC.177 Such screening of reports through internal means may limit false or frivolous claims,
provide the entity an opportunity to resolve the violation and report its resolution to the
Commission, and allow the Commission to use its resources more efficiently. 178 Thus, allowing
individuals initially to report internally provides a mechanism by which erroneous tips may be
eliminated, and also allows the SEC to avoid the incurring of costs to process and validate
information.179
In determining the amount of an award to be paid, one SEC regulation expressly incentivizes
the utilization of a company’s internal reporting system: “Factors that may increase the size of an
award include ... the extent the whistleblower participated in a company’s internal compliance
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systems.”180 The regulation also discourages the undermining of internal compliance: “Factors that
may decrease the size of an award include ... any interference with or undermining of a company’s
internal compliance systems.”181
Although the SEC encourages internal reporting in the first instance, a Company may be
without recourse after it receives information through an internal report because one SEC rule
“prohibits companies from taking any action to impede whistleblowers from reporting possible
securities violations to the SEC.”182 The SEC has asserted that an effective compliance program
should allow for confidential submissions through channels which may include anonymous hotlines
and ombudsmen.183 The program should also include an effective process to investigate and respond
to submissions.184 After all, internal investigations “can be among the most powerful weapons in
the law enforcement arsenal.”185
Admittedly, in practice the regulations may not actually serve to incentivize forward
thinking whistleblowers to pursue a course of conduct which will, years later, increase the amount
of their potential award. More than likely, if the only question at issue is the amount of an award to
be paid, the SEC has already received information through some means and therefore the reporting
person would satisfy the statutory definition of whistleblower. One practical effect of the antiretaliation provision is that it prohibits employer retaliation by placing employers on notice that
they may not retaliate against employees who engage in whistleblowing activities. In a situation
such as the strict liability scenario proposed by the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), an
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employer may be inclined to terminate an employee immediately after it receives an internal report
because the necessary retaliatory intent element would not be present. An employer should do so
in anticipation of losing this ability after it acquires knowledge of the SEC’s involvement. If internal
reports made in conformity with the anti-retaliation provision were unequivocally found to have
been made by persons who satisfy the statutory definition of whistleblower, then employers would
instantly be put on notice that “just cause,” other than the fact that the employee betrayed the
company through whistleblowing, must first exist before the whistleblower is terminated.
VI.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the potential ambiguity of the Whistleblower Program has caused courts to
interpret the statute inconsistently, and judicial opinion to conflict. One possible reading of the
statute holds that employer anti-retaliation protection should only be available to whistleblowers
who provide “information ... to the Commission.”186 This reading is unsound because it causes the
anti-retaliation provision to become superfluous, and is inconsistent with the purposes of security
regulation. My interpretation of the statute and regulations thereunder reveals that employer antiretaliation protection should only be available to whistleblowers who provide “information ... to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”187 Under my
theory, the Commission was given direct authority to establish the manner in which it would receive
information, and the Commission established this manner through various regulations which
implement Dodd-Frank.
Two of the three judicial approaches in existence reach conclusions which are in line with
my theory. The first consists of a minority of courts which find the Whistleblower Program
unambiguous, and also hold that it protects whistleblowers who make disclosures enunciated in the
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anti-retaliation provision. Here, disclosures include those made to entities other than the SEC. The
second consists of a majority of district courts which find the Whistleblower Program ambiguous,
in that it contains provisions which directly conflict. Here, courts defer to the SEC’s interpretation.
The SEC’s interpretation mirrors the first judicial approach which is in line with my theory. My
theory differs in that it finds the Whistleblower Program to provide protection to individuals so long
as the disclosure is within the jurisdiction of the SEC, and at some point in time the SEC assents
that protection should be available. This causes disclosures explicitly provided for in the antiretaliation provision to provide protection to whistleblowers because the SEC has issued
regulations, for purposes of anti-retaliation protection, which incorporate anti-retaliation provision
disclosures into the statutory definition of whistleblower. Because the SEC has authority to
reclassify persons and reports, and has stated that it reserves the right to suspend requirements
during extraordinary circumstances, the SEC possesses the power to extend anti-retaliation
protection to any person who makes any report, as long as the disclosure is within the SEC’s
jurisdiction.
Lastly, the SEC provides incentives for companies to establish internal compliance
programs, and also rewards employees who initially report securities violations through internal
means. Typically, compliance programs also provide incentives for employees to report internally.
This lowers the overall risk of penalties a company may face, as well as lowers costs the SEC must
pay to investigate complaints. If whistleblowers who make internal reports concerning securities
laws violations were not protected by the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision, then employees
would be discouraged from reporting internally. This may lead to an overall decline in corporate
compliance as well as an increase of costs for both the company and the SEC. This risk constitutes
even greater reason to find the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program unambiguous. Companies,
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whistleblowers and the SEC all benefit where whistleblowers who notify entities other than the
SEC concerning information which is within the jurisdiction of the Commission, are safeguarded
by the anti-retaliation protection afforded under Dodd-Frank.
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